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SURGICAL ETHICS CHALLENGES
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A Professor A. Droit, 93 years of age, formerly your college ethics teacher, developed a painful ischemic foot from distal
aortic blockage. A daughter, who is a nurse, brought him to the hospital. He has multiple comorbidities, including
leukemia for which he is getting chemotherapy. He agrees to surgery but hands you a completed do not resuscitate (DNR)
form and insists it be honored throughout his care. As the operative wound is being closed, he has a slow ventricular
tachycardia, which does not respond to intravenous therapy. You should:A. Do nothing else without permission from the daughter.
B. Deﬁbrillate once and inform him later if he survives.
C. Deﬁbrillate once and do not inform him.
D. Institute a full resuscitation and do not inform him.
E. Automatically suspend the DNR when in the operating room.Must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?
eSocrates (in Plato’s Phaedo)Death, so far as we know, is the ﬁnal parameter. Med-
ical knowledge stops when death arrives. Surgeons, in
particular, spend their entire careers jousting with Death.
Even when everything possible has been done, it is a
long painful trip to the waiting room delivering to the pa-
tient’s loved ones some of the worst news of their lives. The
attending surgeon often considers it a blotch on the oper-
ative record and a matter to explain at the next mortality
conference.
Because of the fear that death’s ubiquity and ﬁnality
generates, many of ethics’ knottiest challenges are associ-
ated with end-of-life issues.1 In the distant past, it was an
Admiral David Farragut’s “Damn the torpedoes, full speed
ahead” routine. But more tools have become available to
forestall the reaper, often at a great disease-related and
iatrogenic burden for minimal clinical return.
For most of the history of Western medicine, the stan-
dard of care was for physicians not to take on desperateThe Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of
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2cases in which the physician could reliably predict a high
risk of death. The correlate of this standard of care was
that physicians should stop treating patients who became
so desperately ill that they were likely to die. This standard
was articulated in the Hippocratic texts and brought to
considerable sophistication in the early 18th century by
Friedrich Hoffmann (1660-1742) in his Medicus Politicus
or the “politic physician.” The politic physician understood
that he was subordinate to the power of the well-to-do
who could afford his fees and therefore should conduct
himself with prudence: Identify his legitimate self-interest
and act to protect it.
The logic of prudence in the care of the desperately ill
was straightforward. It would injure one’s reputation to
become known as a physician or surgeon whose patients
died in high numbers, and loss of reputation meant loss
of patients and loss of income.2 There being none of the
economic security that we now take for granted but should
not (the historically unprecedented economic security of
surgeons in the United States dates only from after World
War II), a high mortality rate could result in poverty.
Noting the onset of death was simple, for eons when
the signs of life were absentddeath was perpetual. Then
a half-century ago, a retired professor of engineering, a sur-
gical resident, and an engineering student combined
external electrical shock, mouth-to-nose ventilation, and
closed chest compressions to jump-start life. This genius
team used their method, which they named cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR), on 20 patients, resuscitating
14. CPR complicated the determination of end-of-life
and has provided bioethicists with perhaps their most pop-
ular topic.3
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cording to whether resuscitation would be used. But as
CPR teams were formed, they became more experienced
and would race to save patients of whom they had no
knowledge. Many were brought back to resume dying.
DNR orders became the solution to avoid predicaments.
Indeed, resuscitation has become a default intervention.
Orders must be written not to do it, unlike every other
order a surgeon writes.
American medicine is in transition with the ethics of
end-of-life issues from an aging population, increasing
cost of medical technology, and futility issues. Providing
unnecessary care is ethically just as wrong as failing to pro-
vide indicated care competently.4 The deﬁnition of futility
enables physicians to more accurately determine and feel
justiﬁed in stopping pointless care. DNR orders recognize
and are grounded in the futility concept.
There is an important preventive ethics lesson from
this case. Code status involves important details that
need clariﬁcation. Although 57% of patients agree that
DNR orders should be suspended in the operating room,
the overwhelming majority state the surgeon should
discuss details with the patient.5 Professor Droit should
have been asked to specify what elements of a resuscitation
were allowable and for how long. Dispassionate clinical
evaluation of the patient’s preferences should then have
ensued.
Uninformed of the patient’s wishes, the surgeon might
decide that a DNR order does not apply to a partial resus-
citation, only a full resuscitation. This reasoning is morally
suspect, for without understanding of the patient’s degree
of knowledge of the resuscitation’s components and
permission to use each, the patient’s autonomy is not being
fully respected.6 Options B and C are tempting because a
single shock would likely reverse the predictably fatal
outcome, but a DNR order means quite literally no resus-
citation efforts by medical personnel. Injection of an antiar-
rhythmic drug is primarily therapeutic, whereas applying
the deﬁbrillator is clearly a resuscitative measure. Option
B and C are unacceptable. Option C, by not informing
the patient of a major intraoperative event, is ethically
worse. Option D is the ethical equivalent of option C
and thus is incorrect.
Anesthesiologists and surgeons quite reasonably have
taken the view that intraoperative arrest of a seriously or
terminally ill patient should be regarded as a correctable
side effect of anesthesia and not a function of the
patient’s underlying disease or injury.1 Moreover, intra-
operative resuscitation maintains homeostasis, and pa-
tients usually recover, in sharp contrast to the overalllow success rate of resuscitation (15%) elsewhere in the
hospital.
Seriously or terminally ill patients who consent to sur-
gery can reasonably be presumed to want its functional
improvements and palliative effects, but they will not expe-
rience these outcomes if an intervention that is usually
effective in helping to achieve them is withheld. A strong
case can be made on both clinical grounds and on the basis
of a reasonable assumption about patients’ preferences that
DNR orders should be suspended during surgery for seri-
ously ill or terminally ill patients.
These arguments for suspension of DNR orders in
the operating room do not allow the patient’s autonomy
to be routinely disregarded. These arguments do support
providing the rationale for suspending the patient’s DNR
order and recommending that he accept this management
plan. Providing this information was essential for empower-
ing the exercise of the patient’s autonomy in the informed
consent and therefore should have occurred. If the patient
had refused to allow suspension of the DNR order, the sur-
geon would have been free, as a matter of professional
integrity, to refuse to take the patient to surgery. Commu-
nication skills or lacks of are some of the most important
determinants of success or failure.
As it stands, the patient’s request that his DNR order
remains in place guides clinical judgment and decision
making, and respect for autonomy requires that the pa-
tient’s decision be implemented. One possible remedy is
to ask the daughter, a health professional, for guidance
about whether the patient would want his decision to
remain in effect, option A. If not, then the DNR order
could justiﬁably be suspended, option E. Absent such sur-
rogate authorization, option E is ruled out.
In jousting with the reaper, surgeons win surprising
numbers of jousts, but the tournament is always his.
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